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BRIEFING PAPER 
THE ERM AND SCOTTISH INDUSTRY: PRELIMINARY FINDINGS 
John Struthers, University of Paisley 
INTRODUCTION 
This paper presents the results of a recent questionnaire 
survey of the Top 300 Scottish Companies (as defined in 
the Scottish Business Insider database) on the impact of 
sterling's membership of the European Exchange Rate 
Mechanism (ERM). It is based partly on a previous pilot 
study conducted on a smaller sample of Scottish 
companies (approximately 30). The earlier study was 
completed during the Summer of 1991 and was 
retrospective in design. It covered a series of questions 
relating to the benefits (perceived or otherwise) of ERM 
membership to Scottish firms. The majority of the 
questions were retrospective in the sense that they were 
concerned with (for example): whether Scottish 
companies trade with Europe had improved as a result of 
ERM membership. Some of these questions (with 
adaptations) have been carried forward to this study, 
although the present study has an emphasis on future 
prospects rather than past results. Examples of the 
questions used appear later. 
The topicality of this issue is obvious, particulary in the 
light of recent events in the markets, and especially the 
events of Black Wednesday (16 September 1992). On 
that day, after failed attempts by the Chancellor to stem 
a speculative run against sterling through interest rate 
increases, sterling's membership of the ERM was 
"suspended". This paper will not address the wider 
macroeconomic issues surrounding these events. Rather 
it attempts to deal with the responses of Scottish firms on 
a range of issues related to the ERM debate (see below). 
THE SURVEY 
The study has two main objectives. Although ostensibly 
seeking to ascertain initial company responses to ERM 
membership (before and after), the study will also attempt 
to highlight a number of theoretical aspects often ignored 
in the larger macroeconomic studies. At the micro level, 
do relevant staff (in this case the Finance Directors) have 
adequate statistical and economic information on the 
likely effects on their company of the impact of a stable 
exchange rate environment (which the ERM was until 
recently) on export markets and long term trade? Can 
they quantify the effects on import and export volumes of 
a devaluation? Can they identify, and if possible quantify 
the domestic cost implications of an ERM-type 
arrangement (for example on wage costs)? Can they tell 
whether a currency is, or is not, over valued (within or 
outwith a currency arrangement)? And can they impute 
or calculate the necessary trade-off effects implied by the 
ERM (ie interest rate/inflation rate/currency rate 
interactions)? 
The questionnaire was distributed to Finance Directors in 
the companies involved (287 in total) 2 days after Black 
Wednesday. In an attempt to exploit the topicality of the 
issues raised, the survey contained no less than 29 
separate (though related) questions, and has, to date, 
yielded an excellent response. Approximately 100 
companies have so far responded with 75 "useful" 
responses extending across the spectrum of companies 
identified in the database. The range of companies was 
diverse. Question 1 in Table 3 indicates the company 
breakdown. The "other" category, the largest, is 
extremely broad also and encompasses significant 
components in: food production, oil related services, 
construction, and paper manufacture. Questions 2, 3 and 
4 in Table 3 also give breakdowns according to: number 
of employees; sales turnover, exports/sales ratios; EC 
exports/total exports; and the ratio of borrowed funds to 
internal funds used for net investment purposes. 
In this study some limited attempt is made to establish 
cross-tabulations between the various categories. 
However, that exercise requires more considered 
reflection and the study largely confines itself to 
ascertaining company responses to the specific questions 
posed. Further work is planned of a more statistical 
nature, and selected company visits will also be made. 
A stimulus for this study is given by the dearth of 
microeconomic analyses of the effects on companies of 
currency devaluation. Comparisons have been made 
between the recent sterling crisis and the 1967 
devaluation. Following that devaluation, a series of 
papers appeared analysing company responses to the 
currency adjustment (see Gribben, 1971; Hague, 
Oakeshott and Strain, 1974; Rosendale, 1973; Masera, 
1974 and Holmes, 1978). 
A number of aspects were addressed in these studies such 
as: time-lags and J-Curve effects; the effects of 
devaluation on export volume (related to differing levels 
of profitability between home sales and export sales); the 
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differing reactions of companies in terms of the 
currencies in which invoices were prepared; gaps 
between import responses and export responses (related 
to the elasticities condition and the extent to which 
capacity limits are reached); and the nature of the 
overseas markets in which UK firms operated (ie whether 
competitive or oligopolistic). 
The present study does not intend to address these same 
issues in detail, although inferences will be drawn from 
the questionnaire results, wheTe appropriate. For 
example, some of the above authors concluded, after the 
1967 devaluation, that few UK companies seemed to 
know what the appropriate response was for their own 
company in terms of required price adjustments. Few 
had a clear idea of the importance of export and import 
elasticities to the success of a devaluation; nor the 
relevant elasticities as far as their company's trade was 
concerned. Reference is made to this aspect below. 
Underlying the questions raised in the questionnaire are 
the following fundamental theoretical considerations: 
1. Which is more important to companies - the 
precise level of the currency (the exchange 
rate) or its overall stability/predicability over 
time?; 
2. Which variables have the highest profile - the 
exchange rate, the interest rate, or the inflation 
rate?; 
3. Can appropriate staff in these companies make 
the relevant trade-offs between exchange rate 
stability, interest rate stability and the control 
of inflation?; 
4. Can they determine whether a previous level of 
the exchange rate (for example the level at 
which sterling joined the ERM in October 1990 
was the "right" rate (2.95DM)? And if so, 
"right" in what sense? (the so-called 
"fundamentals" or Purchasing Power Parity 
(PPP); 
5. Do exchange rates really matter?; 
6. Do stable exchange rates (or more stable ones, 
such as those within the ERM) stimulate trade?; 
7. Do stable exchange rates facilitate long-term 
planning vis-a-vis overseas markets?; 
8. Did ERM membership highlight clearly enough 
the need to reduce domestic costs in order to 
compete effectively within Europe?; 
9. Should currencies be pegged or allowed to 
float?; 
costs be calculated post-devaluation?; 
11. Can the beneficial effects of a lower currency 
value on export volumes be calculated?; 
12. What advantages, if any, would accrue from a 
single European currency?; 
13. Do companies support the need for some type 
of government support for industry or the 
economy generally, within an ERM-type 
arrangement?; 
14. Apart from the currency value, which other 
factors influence a company's overseas 
competitiveness (for example, unit costs, 
product quality etc.)?; 
In the questionnaire findings which appear in Tables 1-3 
an attempt is made to address some of these issues. 
However many of them are of a long-term nature and 
will therefore be left to the next stage of the study. 
INTERPRETATION AND ANALYSIS 
In this section of the paper an attempt will be made to 
highlight the main findings of the questionnaire survey. 
These are tentative at this stage, reflecting the short time 
period since the survey was completed and the results 
collated. Some of the questions highlighted earlier will 
be "pooled" for this purpose. 
1. Exchange rate level/stability 
Do exchange rates really matter? 
The evidence from this survey suggests that sterling 
membership of the ERM did not yield substantial benefits 
as far as Scottish companies were concerned. This is 
reflected in responses to questions 1, 2, 3, 7 and 10 in 
Table 1. From these responses it seems clear that the 
majority of the companies in the survey did not perceive 
any clear benefits in terms of stimulating their export 
markets (particulary within the EC). Of course, these 
findings should be interpreted with caution. Is the 
absence of any apparent benefit explained by the greater 
impact of other "non price factors", such as those 
identified in Question 9 of Table 2 (for example unit 
costs, product quality etc)? There is some evidence from 
the responses to that question that this is the case, though 
the high response rate for the "price" element (52%) 
confuses matters. Perhaps the only safe conclusion is 
that companies do not really know what the full impact 
of the currency factor has been especially in isolation 
from other elements.l 
2. Which is more important to companies, the 
exchange rate, the interest rate or the inflation 
rate? 
10. Can the possible inflationary effects on imports Can the appropriate trade-offs be made between these 
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three? 
On the first of these points, responses to Question 6 in 
Table 2 clearly indicate that lower interest rates and 
lower inflation are higher priorities than the need for a 
stable currency. See also responses to Question 9 in 
Table 1 which indicate that declining interest rates during 
the period of ERM membership (and probably more so 
since sterling's suspension of its membership) have had 
beneficial effects on company performance, particularly 
in stimulating investment expenditure. To support this 
conclusion, in a cross-tabulation between Question 9 of 
Table 1, and Question 4 of Table 3, a strong correlation 
using the Chi-Square test was obtained at the 1% 
significance level. Note also the skewed nature of the 
responses to Question 4 in Table 3 (52% of firms borrow 
less than 10% of their total annual net investment 
expenditure, but 17% borrow in excess of 80% of their 
investment expenditure).1 
In terms of the trade-off point, the findings indicate that 
Scottish companies cannot really assess this aspect 
Responses to Question 5 in Table 1 indicate this, even 
although 35% of respondents suggested that lower interest 
rates compensated a little for the high central 
DM/Sterling rate of 2.95DM. Though responses to 
Question 4 of Table 1 suggest that the initial 
Deutschmark/Sterling rate did not place Scottish firms at 
a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis their European 
competitors, making appropriate inferences between that 
issue and that raised in Question 5 of Table 1 is not easy. 
Conflicting responses appear from Questions 4 and 6 of 
Table 1. Whilst in Question 4 only 27% of respondents 
suggested that the initial DM/Sterling rate was too high, 
and 73% disagreed, the complete reverse is indicated in 
the responses to Question 6. Here companies were asked 
whether sterling should have been devalued or realigned 
earlier than it was. From the responses, a large majority 
concurred, but presumably they could not explain why 
sterling should be devalued or by how much. Perhaps 
companies were responding to the general speculative 
attention being given to sterling in recent months. Or it 
could simply be a case of "wiser after the event".2 
3. Has ERM discipline helped to reduce domestic 
costs? 
Should government intervention be used to stimulate 
the economy and assist companies to reduce unit 
labour costs? 
The responses to these questions are interesting (see 
Question 8 in Table 1 and Question 7 in Table 2). A 
higher proportion of respondents answered that the ERM 
made it easier for them to keep their unit costs down 
(especially labour costs). 
Similarly, a reasonably large proportion (48%) indicated 
some support for increased government intervention in 
the economy. (Question 7 in Table 2). These findings 
are also interesting in light of the Chancellor's Autumn 
Statement which indicated a shift of emphasis towards a 
pro-growth stance on the part of the government-3 
Looking to the future, companies were asked to address 
the following questions: 
1. Should sterling rejoin the ERM? 
Here the responses were fairly mixed (see Question 3 in 
Table 2). 58% of respondents indicated support for 
sterling re-entering the ERM, presumably once the so-
called "faultlines" are repaired; 42% indicated that the 
currency should be permitted to float If we combine this 
with the responses to Questions 1 and 2 of Table 2 which 
show great potential for further company expansion 
within EC markets, a small majority of companies would 
like to do so, providing there is some exchange rate 
stability which goes along with it. 
Of course, responses to Question 3 in Table 2 do not 
indicate under what conditions sterling might re-enter the 
system. Should there be a two-speed ERM as some 
commentators have suggested, in which one group of 
countries would have a rigid ERM (those of comparable 
income and growth potentials - the so-called DM-Zone); 
and another slower speed group (with the UK among 
them) which would enjoy greater flexibility in terms of 
band widths and scope for realignments? However, the 
more recent crises affecting the Irish punt, Spanish peseta 
and Portuguese escudo, even casts doubt on that 
possibility. Further analysis is obviously required on 
these aspects. 
Question 8 in Table 2 indicates little support for the 
creation of a single European currency among Scottish 
companies. If the ERM overcomes its current difficulties 
and enjoys a major resurrection, the majority of Scottish 
companies do not see substantial benefits from fuller 
Monetary Union, especially if this leads to the creation of 
a single European currency. 
2. Can the possible inflationary effects on import 
costs be calculated, post-devaluation? 
Can the beneficial effects of a lower currency value on 
export volumes be calculated? 
A crucial area of analysis during any post-devaluation 
period is the assessment of the direct inflationary effects 
of devaluation on the import bill; and the beneficial 
effects on export volumes. Much has been said on this 
issue recently, including statements by the CBI and City 
economists and forecasters. The consensus is that the 
recent devaluation will be good for British industry.4 On 
the exports side, this is based on the view that, unlike in 
1967, the supply capability exists to raise output in 
response to foreign demand increases. Given the 
downward movement in prices over the last year as well 
as in wage costs, (cf the pegging of public sector pay 
awards to 114% during 1993-94), the beneficial export 
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effects are likely to be assisted by lagged inflationary 
expectations as the high import costs make their way 
through the economy (See Fraser of Allander Quarterly 
Economic Commentary Vol 18 No 2, September 1992, 
p3). Hopefully this will convert what is usually termed 
the "vicious cycle effect" of devaluation into a "virtuous 
cycle effect". 
The responses to Questions 4 and 5 in Table 2 indicate 
company reactions and estimates of import and export 
effects respectively. On the imports side, 70% of 
respondents suggest, over the medium to long-term, that 
import costs would not increase substantially post-
devaluation. On the exports side, the outcome is rather 
more ambiguous with only 42% of companies indicating 
an optimistic outlook. 
What these responses do not identify for either imports or 
exports, is the ability of companies to quantify such 
effects or to give reasons for their existence (or non-
existence). Again this should be the subject of further 
analysis. As discussed earlier in the context of the 1967 
devaluation, time-lags of varying duration make analysis 
of the costs and benefits of a devaluation very 
complicated.5 
Though at the macro level mere may be some cause for 
optimism that the devaluation will prove beneficial to the 
UK economy especially if the recent decrease in interest 
rates can realise the much-heralded recovery, at the micro 
level the evidence suggested in this study is that the brunt 
of this adjustment will be bome by the import side of the 
equation rather than the export side. This depends, 
crucially, on the ability of employers to hold their own as 
far as future wage demands are concerned. The rising 
unemployment levels of late will assist them. To counter 
this, of course, the devaluation of Sterling in relation to 
the Deutschmark since Black Wednesday will increase 
the cost of imported raw materials and intermediate 
goods which are not easily replaced by domestic 
equivalents. As always, the potentially beneficial effects 
from a currency devaluation will involve an income 
redistribution impact as wage increases lag behind other 
factor price increases. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The results presented in this paper can be interpreted in 
either of two ways. They can be interpreted on their face 
value. In which case Scottish companies do not seem to 
appreciate the ERM; they do not see the benefits of a 
single European currency; they prefer interest rate cuts 
to exchange rate stability; but they see great potential for 
future expansion within EC markets; they appreciated 
the discipline that the ERM brought with it in terms of 
unit costs (especially wages); and they prefer (on 
balance) some kind of non-floating currency market for 
sterling (whether that is the ERM or not). 
However a different interpretation that can be placed on 
these results relates to the "hidden agenda" mentioned at 
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the outset of this paper. Namely, do even very large 
companies fully understand and appreciate the intricacies 
of exchange rate/interest rate/inflation rate interactions in 
the economy? The answer to this question is probably 
no. In which case we come full circle and reaffirm the 
need for greater in-depth analyses of company responses 
at the microeconomic level. This will avoid the so-called 
"misplaced aggregation" problem hinted at earlier, though 
not mentioned explicitly. 
The difficulty with this topic (which to the author partly 
explains why the questionnaire results are something of 
a "curate's egg") is that it is of such topical interest at the 
moment and will probably remain so for some time to 
come, that analysts will have difficulty disentangling 
company-specific responses which are based on detailed 
knowledge and estimation, from those that reflect the 
consensus view at the macroeconomic level. The latter 
emphasis may have been the dominant one in explaining 
how companies in this study responded to the questions 
posed. The impact of media attention on the ERM 
cannot be overestimated as it can cloud any 
interpretations which can be placed on these findings. 
Nor should we forget the myopia that seems to have 
afflicted companies over this question. Prior to October 
1990 when sterling joined the ERM, a large majority of 
companies in Scotland as well as nationally urged the 
government to link sterling to the system in order to 
eliminate (or reduce) exchange rate uncertainty. Now the 
economic fashion seems to have reverted to the clamour 
for interest rate reductions, even although prior to Black 
Wednesday, these had been implemented though perhaps 
not to the extent or at the speed required. Whether this 
was the fault of the system itself is a big question to 
answer at this early stage; as opposed to the view that 
the inconsistency of government policy was to blame 
(elsewhere as much as in the UK!). Fashions are 
important in economics as in other aspects of life. 
Scottish companies, and this is probably true of 
companies nationally, quite liked the idea of the ERM. 
They did not like the reality, particulary so as it seemed 
to lock the government into the cruel policy dilemmas 
which only began to be unlocked from Black Wednesday 
onwards. 
This process is an on-going one as we write. As the 
economic fashion swings back in the other direction, say 
after a year, the same companies may start again to look 
at the currency sections of whatever quality newspaper 
they read rather than the interest rate sections. 
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TABLE 1 
BENEFITS OF ERM MEMBERSHIP 
Question 
1. Prior to ERM membership did the instability of Sterling have an adverse effect on your company's European trade? 
* 
2. In the period since ERM membership has your company changed its policy with respect to trade with other EC 
countries? 
3. Did ERM membership increase optimism regarding the long-term future of your company's involvement in Europe? 
4. Did the initial 2.95DM/Sterling exchange rate place your company at a competitive disadvantage vis-a-vis your 
competitors in Europe? 
5. To what extent have lower interest rates during the last 2 years offset the possible disadvantage of a high central 
DM/Sterling rate within the ERM? If so, please specify. 
6. In the light of recent strains on the value of Sterling within the ERM should the currency have been 
devalued/realigned earlier than it was? If so, by how much? 
7. During the last 2 years has there been a noticeable improvement in your company's exports to EC countries? 
8. During the last 2 years has it been easier to keep down your company's costs (especially wages) and maintain a 
competitive position within the European Market? 
9. Since ERM membership UK interest rates have fallen. Has this been beneficial to your company? If so, please 
specify (e.g. higher investment). 
10. Apart from recent events within die currency markets, how important has the greater exchange rale certainty of ERM 
membership been to your company's EC export markets? 
TABLE 2 
ERM AND FUTURE PROSPECTS 
Question 
1. Do you feel there is potential for your company to expand further into 
the European market? 
2. Would you consider Europe as being/or becoming a more important market 
for your company than, for example, the US or Japanese markets? 
3. Do you think Sterling should be permitted to float and leave the ERM on a 
permanent basis? 
4. If your answer to question 3 is YES and Sterling continues to depreciate in 
value against its old central ERM rate would this increase your company's 
import costs? If so, can you quantify the effect? 
5. If Sterling is permitted to float indefinitely and depreciates in value would 
this increase your company's EC export market? If so, can you quantify the 
effect? 
6. In the medium to long term, which of the follow prospects would be most 
beneficial to your company? 
7. Do you favour increased government intervention in the UK economy (e.g. increased 
government expenditure to reduce unemployment or industry incentives to reduce 
unit labour costs)? If so, please specify. 
8. Would your company's EC export markets benefit from the creation of a single 
European currency? 
9. In the EC markets in which your company operates which of the following factors 
influence your ability to compete effectively? Please rank them in order of 
priority. 
NB (The percentages add up to moTe than 100% due to the fact thai some companies 
allocate highest rankings to more than 1 category]. 
No. of 
Responde 
69 
66 
69 
69 
67 
72 
72 
60 
70 
TABLE 3 
COMPANY CHARACTERISTICS 
Question 
1. In which industry 
or sector is your 
company? 
2. Would you please 
complete the following 
information about your 
company? 
3. What proportion of your 
company's exports go to 
EC countries? 
4. What proportion of your 
company's annual net 
investment expenditure is 
financed from borrowed 
funds? (as opposed to 
retained earnings) 
No. of 
Respondents 
74 
56-72 
60 
70 
Engineering - 12% 
Financial Services - 7% 
Tobacco & Drinks - 8% 
Textiles - 5% 
Computers - 2% 
Retailing - 3% 
Other (Please Specify) - 63% 
NO. OF EMPLOYEES 
0 - 50 - 4.2% 
51 - 100 - 6.9% 
101 - 250 - 15.3% 
251 - 500 - 18.1% 
501 - 1000 - 23.6% 
1000 Plus-31.9% 
0 - 10% - 42% 
11 - 20% - 5% 
21 - 30% - 13% 
31 - 40% - 5% 
41 - 50% - 8% 
51 - 60% - 7% 
61 - 70% - 3% 
71 - 80% - 2% 
OVER 80% - 17% 
0 - 10% - 52% 
11 -20% - 7% 
21 - 30% - 4% 
31 - 40% - 4% 
41 - 50% - 10% 
51 - 60% - 1% 
61 - 70% - 3% 
71 - 80% - 2% 
OVER 80% - 17% 
SALES TURNOVER 
<£5 Million - 1.4% 
£5-£10 Million - 2.8% 
£10-£25 Million - 21.1% 
£25-£50 Million - 28.2% 
£50-£100 Million - 15.5% 
£100 Million Plus - 31.0% 
NOTES 
1. Although responses to Questions 1-3 in Table 1 do 
not indicate strong support for the benefits derived from 
exchange rate stability within the ERM, those companies 
who responded positively to these questions provided 
supporting evidence to justify their conclusions. For 
example 19 of such respondents highlighted the 
advantages of exchange rate stability for forecasting 
purposes and the reduction of currency risk. Few, if any, 
of the companies who responded negatively added 
supporting information. 
2. Question 9 in Table 2 on the benefits of interest 
rate reductions (within the ERM) includes a wide variety 
of reasons why companies benefited from such reductions 
including: reductions in borrowing costs and on existing 
debt; and improved investment levels. Some companies 
also coupled interest rate reductions with the greater 
control of inflation that accompanied sterling's 
membership of ERM. However a large majority of 
companies expressed disappointment that interest rate 
reductions had not gone far enough. They also 
appreciated the greater freedom to reduce interest rates as 
long as sterling remained outside the ERM, although 
some indicated that once (or if) inflationary pressure 
takes hold again in the economy this "honeymoon" effect 
might dissipate. 
3. Similarly, although the high negative response to 
Question 4 in Table 1 suggests that respondents regarded 
the initial 2.95DM exchange rate of sterling within the 
ERM as appropriate, when we come to Question 6 in 
Table 1 a large number of companies (28 in total) 
proffered suggestions as to the necessary devaluation or 
realignment of sterling (ranging from 5% to 20%). A 
large number also suggested that the adjustment should 
have come much earlier than it did. Media coverage on 
these aspects appeared in articles in the Financial Times 
of October 1 and Glasgow Herald of December 1. In the 
Financial Times article, Andrew Baxter reported on the 
reactions of selected UK engineering companies to the 
sterling devaluation. Whilst optimistic as to the prospects 
for exports with a lower pound, companies expressed the 
view that a rate of 2.50DM was too low. Many did take 
the view that the initial 2.95DM rate was too high, and 
that currency stability was desirable irrespective of 
whether this is achieved inside or outside the ERM. The 
Herald article entitled "Businesses urged to take lead on 
ERM", reports on a recent speech by Sir Jack Stewart-
Clark MEP and President of the Conference of Regions 
of North-West Europe to the Glasgow Chamber of 
Commerce in which he exhorted Scottish companies to 
exert pressure on the government to re-enter the ERM, 
once the so-called "faultlines" had been repaired. This, 
he argued, is necessary in order to avoid the emergence 
of a two-speed Europe. 
4. In response to Question 7 in Table 2 regarding the 
possible advantages of increased government expenditure 
or improved incentives to companies, 11 companies 
targeted the restoration of capital allowances, while 7 
highlighted the need to increase public expenditure on 
education and training. 
5. Some beneficial effects of sterling's exit from the 
ERM are being felt in the oil industry. Since Black 
Wednesday the stronger dollar - the currency in which oil 
is traded - has boosted output A recent estimate 
produced in the Royal Bank of Scotland's monthly oil 
index suggests that an additional £15 million may be 
added to oil output daily. 
6. In Questions 4 and 5 in Table 2, very few 
companies could estimate either increases in their import 
costs, post-devaluation, or the likely growth in their 
export markets. These estimates varied between 2%-10% 
on the imports side and 6%-10% on the exports side; 
although no indication was given as to how these 
calculations were made. A small number of respondents 
indicated that they received payment in dollars (or other 
currency) for their export sales. 
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